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Abstract 
This paper establishes an optimal time incentive/disincentive-based compensation in a contract 
between a principal and a team of agents. The establishment is based on solving an optimization 
problem. In order to validate the paper's theoretical development practitioners were engaged in a 
designed exercise. The paper demonstrates that, at the optimum: the proportion of time 
incentive/disincentive compensation among agents with the same risk-attitude should reflect the 
levels of their contributions; the proportion of time incentive/disincentive among agents with the 
same level of contribution should be lowered for agents with higher levels of risk aversion; and 
the proportion of time incentive/disincentive to a team of risk averse agents should reduce, and 
the fixed component of the team fee should increase, when the agents in the team become more 
risk-averse or the level of the uncertainty in project completion time increases. The paper’s 
outcome provides guidance to those involved in contracts design for choosing the best way to 
reward (penalize) multiple agents, form a team, and allow for any time saving (overrun) through 
the terms of a contract.   
Keywords: Time incentive/disincentive compensation, multiple agents, uncertainty, risk, 
contribution. 
Paper type: Research article 
Introduction 
A multi-agent arrangement might be engaged by the principal (owner, client, investor) in large 
construction projects where extensive resources, skills and expertise are required (Ross, 2006). 
Entering foreign construction markets has also motivated the formation of a multi-agent 
arrangement, combining foreign and local firms. The term 'multi-agent arrangement' here refers 
to situations where a team of agents (for example in the form of consortia) is engaged by the 
principal for carrying out the principal's work. In such arrangements, project completion time is 
dependent on both the agents’ effort and uncertainty in the completion time.  This inevitably 
causes the agency problems because the agents’ efforts (actions) cannot be fully monitored by the 
principal or a third party (e.g., court) due to information asymmetry and thus cannot be 
contractible. Putting in effort costs the agents and as such they may not provide the efforts that 
the principal desires, adversely affecting the project completion time (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
To cope with this agency problem, also known as moral hazard problem, the principal may 
provide a time incentive/disincentive, in monetary units, to the agents as measured by project 
completion time expressed relative to a target time (Eisenhardt, 1989; Zhao, 2005; Hosseinian and 
Carmichael 2013a). The incentive aligns the agents’ interests with those of the principal, but at the 
price of transferring risk of project completion time to the agents. The tradeoff between 
incentives and risk in determining a time incentive/disincentive arrangement is vital to the design 
of compensation with an incentive arrangement (Weitzman, 1980).   
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In construction literature, the notion of time incentive contracts is well established and 
discussions of such contracts date back to the early 1980s (Barnes, 1983). However, no 
publications exist investigating the time incentive problem in contracts with a team of agents, 
even though a team of agents (contractors, consultants), for example in the form of consortia, are 
commonly engaged for delivering large-scale projects.  Inappropriate time incentive arrangements 
may reduce performance (Bresnen and Marshall, 2000) and may lead to allocating too much or 
providing little risk to the contracting parties (Chang, 2013) resulting in disagreements which 
eventually distort relationships among the parties (Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2005). In the 
United Kingdom, as discussed by Chang (2013), a host of high-profile project failures are related 
to inappropriate incentive arrangements (see for example National Audit Office, 2009). Although 
risk management guides suggest that any risk associated with time underrun/overrun should be 
allocated to the party which can best manage it (Walewski and Gibson, 2003), in practice it is not 
always clear what is the optimal way to find the bearer of a risk source (Chang, 2013) and how far 
the risk can be transferred to the agent? Hughes et al. (2012), Chang (2013) and Hosseinian and 
Carmichael (2013a, b and 2014) all call for further research on a time incentive arrangement that is 
ideal for construction projects. This paper looks to fill the knowledge gap, and derives the optimal 
form of a time incentive/disincentive-based compensation in a construction contract between a 
principal and a team of agents. The derivation is based on solving an optimization problem. A 
time incentive/disincentive is established based on a sharing of a project's equivalent monetary 
time underrun/overrun (expressed relative to a benchmark or target time that is desired by the 
principal), while aligning the agents’ interests with those of the principal. The paper provides new 
guidance to principals and agents on the best way to provide incentives for a team of agents for 
early project completion time or to penalize them for project overrun through the terms of a 
contract. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, an exploration of current literature is 
provided. This is followed by a description of the time incentive problem. The theoretical results 
are then documented and subsequently tested in a designed exercise.   
Literature review 
Time incentive contracts are especially applicable in projects where the date of completion is 
important (Choi and Kwak, 2012). Abu-Hijlen and Ibbs (1989) argued that if early completion 
produces a sizable and early return on investment, the principal could afford to share a proportion 
of the expected benefits and create an incentive for the agent, one example being the use of time 
incentive contracts in highway projects which has helped to significantly reduce construction time 
(Arditi and Yasamis, 1998).  Jaraiedi et al. (1995) pointed out that a project should be considered 
as a target time arrangement when, due to the safety of the community, road users, and/or the 
agent’s employees, the project needs to be finished in the shortest possible time. Investigating the 
experience of U.S. highway agencies in incentives, Jaraiedi et al. (1995) concluded that incentive 
contracts work more effectively in reducing delivery time than in cutting costs.  
A number of studies have examined time incentive arrangements in construction contracts 
typically where they apply to only one agent contracts. For example, Al-Subhi Al-Harbi (1998) 
used utility theory to explain how principals and agents determine the best incentive arrangement. 
Ward and Chapman (1994) argued that agents could nominate a time sharing value as part of their 
bid; and Sappington (1991) wrote of an iterative approach between the principal and the agent to 
establish the agent's incentive compensation. Alternatively, McGeorge and Palmer (2002) 
suggested that the allocation of a monetary incentive should be 50% of the saving to the principal 
due to the time underrun and 50% to the other parties to the project; divided proportionately to 
each of the other parties’ contributions.  
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Perry and Barnes (2000) suggested avoiding a proportion of time risk sharing to the agent less 
than 50%.  Broome and Perry (2002) concluded that there is need for research on the interaction 
of risk and the selection of an incentive arrangement. Love et al. (2011) argued 50:50 time risk 
sharing underpins the equality of the principal and agent relationship. Badenfelt (2008) identified 
three factors influencing the choice of the proportion of incentive to the agent, namely perception 
of fairness, knowledge of target and long-term relationships. To develop a proper incentive 
arrangement, Badenfelt (2008) recommended that the contracting parties collect trustworthy data 
about each other’s skills, reputation and target time. Based on a survey, Chan et al. (2011) 
suggested that any time incentive arrangement should be established based on risk control ability 
of both agent and client. Hosseinian and Carmichael (2013a, b and 2014) addressed the optimal 
incentive problem in construction projects with a single agent. Using principal-agent theory 
Chang (2013) investigated the consequence of contract breakup into risk allocation decisions.  
Table 1: Related research for optimal time sharing in contracts 
Area of 
Studies 
Method Methodology Advantages Limitations Reference 
Economics Theoretical 
investigation 
Principal-agent 
theory 
Developing 
optimal 
incentive 
contracts 
Lack of empirical 
research; considering one 
agent contracts 
Holmstrom 
(1979); 
Holmstrom 
and Milgrom 
(1987); 
Construction 
and project 
management 
Theoretical 
investigation 
Utility theory Proposing a  risk 
sharing model 
Lack of empirical 
research; considering one 
agent contracts; ignoring 
optimal time sharing 
Al-Subhi Al-
Harbi (1998) 
Theoretical 
investigation 
Discussion Suggesting a 
proportion of 
time risk sharing 
to the agent 
more than 50% 
Lack of empirical 
research; ignoring agents 
risk attitudes and 
outcome uncertainties; 
considering one agent 
contracts; ignoring 
optimal time sharing 
Perry and 
Barnes (2000) 
Theoretical 
investigation 
Principal-agent 
theory 
Analyzing risk-
sharing 
Lack of empirical 
research; considering one 
agent contracts, ignoring 
optimal time sharing 
Chang (2013) 
Theoretical 
and 
empirical 
investigation 
Agency theory, 
interviews 
Proposing 
optimal 
incentive 
contracts 
Considering one agent 
contracts; ignoring 
optimal time sharing 
Hosseinian 
and 
Carmichael 
(2013a, b and 
2014) 
Empirical 
investigation 
Alliance 
contracting; 
interviews 
Proposing a risk 
sharing model 
Ignoring agents risk 
attitudes and project time 
uncertainties 
Love et al. 
(2011) 
Empirical 
investigation 
Questionnaire 
survey 
Presenting the 
effects of some 
factors on 
incentive 
contracts 
Considering one agent 
contracts; ignoring 
optimal time sharing 
Badenfelt 
(2008) 
Empirical 
investigation 
Questionnaire 
survey 
Developing a 
risk sharing 
model 
Considering one agent 
contracts; ignoring 
optimal time sharing 
Chan et al. 
(2011) 
Despite an extensive body of publications on time incentive contracts, a review of the literature, 
as shown in Table 1, reveals that few studies have examined the influence of factors affecting the 
choice of a time incentive arrangement (Al-Subhi Al-Harbi, 1998; Broome and Perry, 2002; 
Badenfelt, 2008; Hosseinian and Carmichael, 2013a, b and 2014). No literature appears to have 
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focused on the optimal time incentive compensation arrangement in contracts with multiple 
agents.  In light of this, this paper gives original derivation for optimal time incentive 
compensation arrangements in construction multi-agent contracts. The derivation is based on 
solving an optimization problem using concepts from agency theory; a theory with roots in 
economics literature. This theory provides a useful insight into the incentive problem (Eisenhardt, 
1989) and is relevant to the study of construction. While the theory developed in this paper can be 
applied, with little modification, to any part of the project work, the attention is mostly limited to 
the whole project for the relative important of project completion time.  
It is noticed that a sharing arrangement may be applied to more than one project outcome (cost, 
time, quality and so on) particularly in alliance projects when the principal is concerned about 
more than one project outcome (Ross, 2006). By contrast, this paper focuses solely on the optimal 
form of a time sharing arrangement. When the sharing applies to more than one project outcome, 
selecting an optimal sharing arrangement becomes more complicated.  Although some studies 
have looked at multiple outcome sharing (Sakal, 2005; Love et al., 2011) choosing an appropriate 
sharing arrangement to date has not been based on scientifically sound evidence or mathematical 
calculation (Badenfelt, 2008). Previous research has stressed that the sharing arrangement should 
be fair (Bower et al., 2002; Badenfelt, 2008; Love et al., 2011), though how fair and unfair are 
defined is undetermined in construction contracts. This paper gives guidance on the setting of 
time sharing in contracts with multi-agent arrangements. 
Problem description 
The time incentive problem can be formulated as a constrained optimization problem using idea 
from agency (principal–agent) theory (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987). Consider a team of agents 
(contractors, consultants) is engaged by the principal (owner, client) (for example in the form of a 
consortia) to perform a task (for example to carry out a project) and the principal is concerned 
about the task time/duration (for example project completion time). The principal is not able to 
fully monitor the effort (action) of the agents (hard-working or shirking) due to asymmetric 
information (Petersen, 1993); the agents are potentially able to extend the time a job takes by 
shirking or not working effectively as the principal does not have any access to such information. 
As the agents’ efforts cannot be verified by a third party and thus cannot be contracted on and 
also as the agents’ efforts are costly, the agents might not put the necessary level of effort required 
by  the principal leading to an undesired outcome, for example late project completion. To 
overcome this problem, known as the moral hazard problem (Holmstrom, 1979), the principal 
might provide a time incentive contract to the agents based on sharing the monetary value of time 
underrun (early completion saving) while penalizing the agents for any cost to the principal due to 
time overrun (late completion cost) relative to a target duration (Laffont and Martimort, 2001). 
This contract needs to maximize the principal's expected utility, while ensuring that the agents 
agree to the contractual arrangement and the agents provide acceptable effort levels for the 
principal; this defines the objective function and the constraints to the optimization problems.  
The time incentive problem involving a team of agents typically exists in two components 
(Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987; Lambert, 2001). The first is how to provide time incentives to 
the team. The second is how to distribute the team’s incentive among the agents within the team.  
A possible time incentive compensation with a team of two agents, i = 1 (Agent A) and i = 2 
(Agent B), may determine the agents’ fees based on a target time contract according to,  
( )i i iFee F s Tt At k= + −   i = 1, 2       (1) 
where Fi is a fixed component of an agent’s fee; si is a (risk) sharing ratio for agent i, taking values 
in the range 0 to 1; Tt is a target time estimate of the project; At is the actual time of the project; 
and k converts time units to cost units; for example, late completion in contracts is reflected by 
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the amount inserted in the contract for liquidated damages. Upper and lower limits can be 
additionally placed on the fee. The agent’s fee goes up or down depending on the actual time. For 
time overruns, the fee is adjusted down (disincentive); for actual time less than estimated, the fee 
is adjusted up (incentive). It might be noted that Equation (1) focuses on contracts in which the 
agent's fee is a linear function of output (actual time). Although a nonlinear payment may lead to a 
better outcome for the principal, the linear class of payment is studied for the following reasons.  
Firstly, simulation-based research has shown that the difference in results arising from the use of a 
linear payment assumption is relatively small (Basu and Kalyanaram, 1990; Raju and Srinivasan, 
1996).  Secondly, it is straightforward to implement managerially.  Finally, the choice of a linear 
payment assumption is consistent with that of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), who show that 
linear payments may indeed be the optimal form where agents continuously influence effort and 
observe output. 
Care has to be exercised in establishing the target time estimate. Too high a time estimate is easy 
for the agent to achieve, too low an estimate is hard to achieve. In order to deal with this issue, 
the target estimate can be agreed by the parties, or established by a third independent party 
(Hosseinian and Carmichael, 2013a). 
The sum of the agents’ fees is the total fee paid by the principal to the agents’ team.  Accordingly, 
the team’s fee can be given by, 
( ) ( )
2 2
i i
i 1 i 1
Fee F s Tt At k F s Tt At k
= =
= + − = + −∑ ∑
     (2) 
where F is a fixed component of the team’s fee, and s is the team’s (risk) sharing ratio, taking 
values in the range 0 to 1, 
2
i
i 1
s s 1
=
= ≤∑
          (3) 
The principal’s problem is to offer a time incentive contract to a team of agents with a fee defined 
as in Equations (1) and (2) to maximize the principal’s expected utility. This contract needs to 
include a minimum fee required to motivate the agents to agree to the contractual arrangement. 
The contract also needs to maximize the agents’ expected utility to motivate the agents to select 
the effort levels favored by the principal (both interpreted as constraints).  
Proposed optimization problem   
The following derives the optimal form of a time incentive/disincentive contract under defined 
risk assumptions on the agents (risk averse ranging to risk neutral) and the principal (risk neutral).  
This is particularly relevant when a large principal organization, which may likely be risk-neutral, 
engages a team of risk averse contractors to perform work.   
Let us assume the project time underrun/overrun is dependent on the agents' efforts, denoted by 
ei, and events which are outside of the agents’ influence, allowed for through a noise term, 
denoted by ε, representing the uncertainty in actual time. ε is assumed to be normally distributed 
with a mean of zero and variance σ2 in accordance with agency literature (Holmstrom and 
Milgrom, 1987).  For the purpose of this paper it is also assumed that all agents have the 
appropriate skills, and that the project time underrun/overrun varies linearly with effort, e, giving,  
( ) ε+ψ=− ∑
=
2
1i
iiekAtTt         (4) 
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The constant coefficient iψ represents the contribution of agent i towards the project completion 
time. An agent’s contribution level might be based on that agent’s expenditure as a proportion of 
the total team cost (Ross, 2006; Love et al., 2011). However, where expenditure does not properly 
reflect the relative influence of each agent on the project completion time, the value used for 
contribution level can be adjusted (Ross, 2006). The linearity assumption is not critical, rather it 
simplifies the mathematical manipulation.  Coughlan and Sen (1989) demonstrate that this 
linearity assumption does not involve much loss of generality. 
The agent’s fee, denoted as Fee, is taken as being dependent on the project completion time as 
given by Equations (1) and (2). 
The principal enjoys the monetary value of time saving, (Tt-At), but has to pay the agents’ fee.  
Therefore, the principal’s utility (or payoff), in monetary units, is the difference between the 
monetary value of time saving received and the fee paid. The principal is assumed here to be risk-
neutral. Using Equations (1) and (4), and the notation E[Up] to denote expected value, the 
expected utility of the principal is given by, 
[ ] ∑∑∑
===
−





ψ





−=
2
1i
i
2
1i
ii
2
1i
iP Fen1UE        (5) 
The agents receive their fees, and apply effort, but incur costs.  Let Ci(ei) be the monetary disutility 
of action (effort level, ei) that cannot be charged to the project. 
The agents are assumed to be risk-averse (including risk neutral as an extreme), with utility defined 
in terms of the agent’s level of satisfaction arising from a change in the wealth level, denoted by, 
π ,  
)(U ii π   i = 1, 2        (6a) 
Here the wealth level (π ) can be defined as the difference between the fee received and the cost 
of the agents' effort, 
)e(CFee iiii −=π   i = 1, 2       (6b) 
The agents are normally assumed to have a concave utility function to reflect the agent’s aversion 
to risk taking. Exponential, power and linear-exponential are candidate functions (Kirkwood, 
2004).  The exponential utility function is a popular choice in the modeling (Holmstrom and 
Milgrom, 1987; Kirkwood, 2004), and for the agents has the form, 
)]CFee(exp[1)CFee(U iiiiii −×η−−=−   i = 1, 2    (7) 
where ηi is the level of risk aversion. As η becomes smaller, the utility function displays less risk 
aversion; when η is zero, the agent becomes risk-neutral.  
Optimization components 
The agents wish to maximize their expected utility through the choice of effort, e.  Maximizing 
the expected utility itself can arrive at the same result as maximizing the certainty equivalent of the 
contract (Clemen and Reilly, 2001). A certainty equivalent is a fee that is the same in the agent's 
mind to a corresponding situation that involves uncertainty, and equals the expected fee minus 
the cost of its effort, Ci(ei), minus a risk premium. 
Certainty equivalenti = Expected feei – Ci(ei) – Risk premiumi i = 1, 2             (8) 
A risk premium is defined as the cost of the risk borne by the agent depending on the variance of 
its fee and how risk-averse it is.  Barnes (1983) argues that agents often assess the expected cost of 
the work and then add a single risk premium associated with the size of the total risk being borne.  
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For obtaining the risk premium, a suitable approximation is discussed in Clemen and Reilly (2001) 
and Kirkwood (2004).  It is given by, 
2
s
emiumPrRisk
2
i
2
i
i
ση
=   i = 1, 2                     (9) 
where σ2 is variance of the monetary value of time underrun/overrun. 
The expected fee to each agent can be obtained by substituting Equation (4) into Equation (1), 
while noting that E[ε] = 0, 
E[Feei] = Fi + si iψ ei          (10) 
Following Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987, 1991) and Feltham and Xie (1994), each agent’s cost 
function Ci(ei) is assumed to raise with ei at an increasing rate. The simplest functional form that 
meets this requirement can be written as, 
2
i
i
ii e2
m)e(C =          (11) 
where m is a coefficient converting units of effort2 to monetary units. 
Substituting Equations (9), (10) and (11) in (8), the certainty equivalents corresponding to the 
agents' expected utilities can be given by, 
2
s
e
2
mesFCE
2
i
2
2
2
1i
iiiii
i
i
σψ
−−





ψ+= ∑
=
   i = 1, 2       (12) 
The principal’s problem is to offer a contract to the agents’ team with a fee, defined in Equation 
(2), in order to maximize its expected utility, see Equation (5), 
∑∑∑
===
−





ψ





−
2
1i
i
2
1i
ii
2
1i
iF,F,s,s
Fes1Max
2121
       (13) 
This contract needs to include a minimum fee, MinFeei, required by each agent to motivate the 
agents to agree to the contractual arrangement, 
i
2
2
1i
iiii feeMine2
mesF
i
≥−





ψ+ ∑
=        (14) 
Each agent selects the effort level that maximizes its certainty equivalent. As a consequence, the 
effort level favored by the principal needs to maximize the agent’s certainty equivalent, 
2
s
e
2
mesF Max
2
i
2
2
2
1i
iiiie
i
i
i
σψ
−−





ψ+ ∑
=
 i = 1, 2       (15) 
Expressions (14) and (15) represent the constraints of the proposed optimization problem. The 
first constraint (14) is called the individual rationality constraint (Kraus, 1996). The second 
constraint (15) is called the incentive compatibility constraint. Its purpose is to motivate the 
agents to behave in the principal's interest. The incentive compatibility constraint reflects the 
restriction whereby the principal can observe the agents’ outcome (project time 
underrun/overrun) but not their efforts (Kraus 1996). Expressions (13), (14) and (15) constitute 
the optimization problem.  
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Optimization results 
Differentiating expression (12) with respect to ei and setting it to zero provides the optimal level 
of effort (denoted by *), 
i
i* s
m
e
i
ψ
=        i = 1, 2       (16) 
It follows that, at the optimum, the principal does not need to pay the agents more than the 
minimum fee required by the agents to agree to the contractual arrangement. Thus, the optimal 
value of Fi would be such that expression (14) holds as an equality, that is, 
2
e
2
mesfeeMinF
2
i
2
2
2
1i
iiii
* i
ii
σηψ
++





ψ−= ∑
=
      i = 1, 2   (17) 
Substituting Equations (16) and (17) into (13), and simplifying it, the principal’s problem can be 
rewritten as, 
∑∑
==







 σηψ
+
ψ
+−






 ψ 2
1i
2
i
2
2
2
i
2
1i
i
2
s,s 2
s
m2
feeMins
m
 Max i
i
ii
21      (18) 
Differentiating expression (18) with respect to ni and setting it to zero provides the optimal 
sharing ratio, 
i
i
*
2
i
2
1s
m1
=
η σ
+
ψ
         i = 1, 2         (19) 
Equation (19) generally shows that **
ji
ss ≥  if jjii // ηψ≥ηψ  and ** ji ss ≤  if jjii // ηψ≤ηψ , 
where i and j represent any two of the n agents within the team. 
Substituting Equation (19) into (17), leads to the optimal fixed components of an agents fee, 
1 2
1 1
2 2
* *2 * * *2 2
1 min 1 2 1 1
1F F s s s s
2m m 2
ψ ψ
= − − + η σ
     (20a) 
2
2
2 2
* * 2 * * * 2 21
2 min 2 1 2 2 2
1F F s s s s
2b m 2
ψ ψ
= − − + η σ                  (20b) 
where 
imin
F  is the minimum fee required by agent i to motivate them to agree to the contractual 
arrangement. 
Based on Equations (19), (20a) and (20b), the optimal time incentive/disincentive contract with a 
team of risk averse agents is obtained by using, 
( ) ( )
2 2
* * * *
i i
i 1 i 1
Fee F s Tt At k F s Tt At k
= =
= + − = + −∑ ∑
     (21) 
In practice, a risk cap may be set by some agents so that a small return margin or zero loss is 
guaranteed to the agents; however, this can lead to extra costs for the principal (Carmichael, 2000; 
Love et al., 2011). 
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The development of propositions 
Sharing monetary value of time underrun/overrun among agents 
Equation (19) demonstrates that in the case where agents have the same level of risk aversion, 
namely η 1 = η 2, but different levels of contribution in the project, that agent with a higher level 
of contribution should receive/bear a higher proportion of monetary value of time 
underrun/overrun (incentive/disincentive).  This leads to the following proposition. 
Proposition 1. The proportion of monetary value of time incentive/disincentive among agents 
(in a team), with the same level of risk aversion, needs to be higher for agents with a higher 
contribution to the project. 
Equation (19) also shows that in the case where agents have the same level of contribution in the 
project, namely ψ 1 = ψ 2, but different levels of risk aversion, that the agent with a higher level 
of risk aversion should receive/bear a lower proportion of monetary time underrun/overrun 
(incentive/disincentive).  This leads to the second proposition. 
Proposition 2. The proportion of monetary value of time incentive/disincentive among agents 
(in a team), with the same level of contribution, needs to be lower for agents with higher levels of 
risk aversion. 
Sharing monetary value of time underrun/overrun between principal and agents’ team 
Based on Equation (19), where the agents’ levels of risk aversion increase or the level of 
uncertainty in the project time increases, the team's share of the monetary value of time 
underrun/overrun needs to decrease in order to contain the cost of the risk borne by the agents 
(risk premium).  This leads to the third proposition. 
Proposition 3. The proportion of monetary value of time incentive/disincentive to a team of 
risk-averse agents needs to reduce (3a) with increasing uncertainty level in the project time, or (3b) 
with increasing agent risk aversion. 
Based on Equations (20a) and (20b), to motivate risk-averse agents to accept the contract, the 
agent team’s fixed fee, F in Equation (2), needs to increase as the time uncertainty or risk aversion 
levels of the agents increase.  This leads to the last proposition. 
Proposition 4. With a team of risk-averse agents, the team’s fixed fee needs to increase (4a) with 
increasing time uncertainty, or (4b) with increasing agent risk aversion. 
Empirical support for the theoretical results-outline 
Agent sample 
In order to provide empirical support for the above theoretical results, an empirical study was 
conducted on a sample of mid-sized construction contractors (agents) in Iran whose work is 
generally commercial building and industrial projects in the approximate range $5-15 million; this 
covers the cost of most buildings in Iran. Senior staff members (one from each organization 
represented), engaged in contracts on behalf of these organizations, were asked to make decisions 
as representatives of their organizations; that is, as corporate decision-makers, not as private 
individuals dealing with their own funds. A random sample of 70 contractor organizations were 
contacted for the interview, of which 48 participated in the research. The appropriateness of a 
small-sample size is not an uncommon issue in construction management studies. For instance, 
the sample size of the earlier research of Love et al. (2011) and Badenfelt (2008) were 29 and 16, 
respectively. All participants in this study were experienced construction practitioners; 43.8% of 
the participants had more than 21 years of experience in the construction industry, and 33.4% of 
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the participants between 11 and 20 years, as illustrated in Table 2. The number of projects in 
which the participants have been involved is considerable as shown in Table 2; 43.75% of the 
contractors were engaged in more than 26 projects, 47.92% of the contractors between 5 and 25 
projects and the rest (8.33%) less than 5 projects. The participants' positions in their organizations 
are shown in Table 2. Due to the considerable experience of the participants, induction based on 
their responses can be regarded as very persuasive. Although primary reference is to construction 
projects and contractors, the solutions presented here apply equally to other agents (consultants) 
and related project types. Before interviewing participants, a pilot interview study, fine-tuning and 
validation of the interview questions was conducted with a number of experienced project 
managers from contractor organizations. 
 
Table 2:  Experience, involvement in projects and positions of the participants in the study 
Experience 
(years) 
< 5 5 to 10 11 to 15 16 to 20 21 to 25 26 to 30 31 to 35 > 35 
Percentage 4.2 18.8 18.8 14.6 18.8 10.4 8.3 6.3 
         
Number of 
projects 
< 5 5 to 15 16 to 25 26 to 35 36 to 45 46 to 55 > 55 
Percentage 8.3 27.1 20.8 16.7 12.5 8.3 6.2 
         
Position Project manager Contract manager Executive director Construction manager 
Percentage 39.6 31.3 14.6 14.6 
 
Interview parts 
The interview questions comprised four parts, and established: (i) participant levels of risk 
aversion; (ii) the effect of level of risk aversion and the contribution level of agents in the project 
on the monetary time incentive/disincentive for agents; and (iii) the effect of actual time 
uncertainty and the effect of level of risk aversion on monetary time incentive for team. 
(i) Participant levels of risk aversion 
The participants were interviewed to measure their levels of risk-aversion, based on certainty 
equivalence (Clemen and Reilly, 2001). The interview presented the decision maker (contractor) 
with a hypothetical, uncertain contract with a 50:50 chance of either gaining αTc or losing half of 
that amount.  α is a constant which varies between 0 and 1; and Tc is the target estimate of the 
work that they typically carry out. The value of α is adjusted during the interview. The largest 
value of αTc is approximately equal to the decision maker’s risk tolerance. The inverse of the risk 
tolerance equals the level of risk aversion. The participants were asked to consider an uncertain 
contract with a target cost kept constant at $10M. Due to the affect the economic situation may 
have on their responses, the participants were asked to make decisions based on a normal 
economic situation and normal workload; this is because, for example, if the contractor has a 
heavy work load or is almost out of work, it may have a different level of risk aversion 
(Willenbrock, 1973).   
(ii) Monetary time incentive/disincentive for agents 
For a fee defined as in Equation (1), the participants were asked to choose the desired value of 
sharing ratio, si, where they play the role of Agent A in a consortium of two agents.  Three 
scenarios were designed, based on the contribution level of Agent A in the project, compared 
with that for Agent B: namely ψ 1 = ψ 2; ψ 1 > ψ 2; and ψ 1 < ψ 2.  In the cases where ψ 1 > 2ψ  
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and ψ 1 < ψ 2, the agents were told to make decisions based on ratios of ψ 1 to ψ 2 of 60/40 and 
40/60, respectively.  
(iii) Monetary time incentive for teams 
For a fee defined as in Equation (2), the participants were asked to choose a desired team’s 
monetary value of time underrun/overrun (incentive/disincentive ratio), s, and a desired team 
tendered fee, F, assuming they were Agent A in a team of two similar agents. The agents were 
required to make their decisions in four different uncertainty scenarios. Each scenario provided 
the participants with different levels of uncertainty in the monetary value of time 
underrun/overrun of the work due to events outside of the contractor's influence, as shown in 
Table 3. This table presents the variances of the monetary value of time underrun/overrun, σ2, 
calculated by using the PERT-style. 
 
Table 3: Uncertainty level due to events outside the contractor's influence  
 Monetary value of time overrun/underrun  
Uncertainty 
level 
Pessimistic (overrun) Most likely Optimistic 
(underrun) 
2
2Tc
σ
 
Very low -0.05Tc 0 0.05Tc 0.0003 
Low -0.10Tc 0.10Tc 0.0011 
Usual -0.15Tc 0.15Tc 0.0025 
High -0.25Tc 0.25Tc 0.0070 
Very high -0.30Tc 0.30Tc 0.0100 
Empirical study - results 
Participant levels of risk aversion 
The results of risk aversion measurement, shown in Figure 1, reveal that the level of risk aversion 
among the participants varies between 5 (least averse) and 33.3 (most averse) as the proportion of 
the target cost estimate of the work that they typically carry out. 
 
Figure 1: Risk attitudes of the sample of agents 
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Monetary time incentive/disincentive for agents 
Table 4 shows the average sharing ratio values selected by risk-averse contractors when they play 
the role of Contractor A.  This table shows the average sharing ratio values selected by risk-averse 
contractors when they play the role of Contractor A. For example, the first row of Table 4 
illustrates that the participants with level of risk aversion, η , equals to 33.33/Tc selected on 
average 0.20, 0.10 and 0.05 sharing ratio values in cases ψ 1 > ψ 2, ψ 1 = ψ 2 and ψ 1 < ψ 2 , 
respectively, for Contractor A. In this table the symbol iψ  represents the contribution of 
contractor i towards the project completion time. The ranking of sharing ratio values selected by 
contractors with the same level of risk aversion, from high to low respectively, belong to the cases 
where ψ 1 > ψ 2, ψ 1 = ψ 2 and  ψ 1 < ψ 2. This implies that risk-averse contractors prefer a high 
sharing ratio value in a consortium of two contractors when they have a higher contribution level 
towards the actual time compared to the other contractor. This supports the validity of 
Proposition 1. This result is consistent with Chang (2013) who asserts that any time 
incentive/disincentive arrangement should be based on a real ability of a party (agent) to manage 
and mitigate the risk. 
 
Table 4: Sharing ratio for Agent A selected by participants 
η×Tc ψ 1 > ψ 2 ψ 1 = ψ 2 ψ 1 < ψ 2 
33.33 0.20 0.10 0.05 
25.00 0.23 0.13 0.08 
20.00 0.20 0.13 0.05 
16.67 0.29 0.18 0.09 
14.29 0.25 0.15 0.10 
12.50 0.35 0.24 0.12 
10.00 0.34 0.24 0.12 
8.33 0.35 0.26 0.14 
6.67 0.43 0.28 0.16 
5.00 0.45 0.30 0.18 
Table 4 also supports the validity of the theoretical results in terms of the relationship between an 
agent’s share of monetary value of time underrun/overrun (incentive/disincentive) and the level 
of risk aversion in a consortium (Equation 19). It shows that an increase in the value of s1 follows 
from a decrease in level of risk aversion.  This supports the validity of Proposition 2. This result is 
consistent with Ward et al. (1991) who argues that “allocation should be based on the willingness 
of parties to take on a risk”. This result is also supported by the alliance literature. For example, 
Ross (2006) argues that a sharing arrangement, which may be suitable for one project, is unlikely 
to be appropriate for another project due to differences in an agent's risk appetite. In the same 
vein, Al-Subhi Al-Harbi (1998) suggests that the agent needs to be open about its risk attitude 
and, in particular, its level of risk aversion. This will assist the principal and agent in reaching 
agreement on the optimal time sharing. 
For level of risk aversion,η , indicator variables y1 and y2 (coding defined in Table 5), and constant 
coefficients α0, α1, α2 and α3, a regression equation of the following form can be described:  
( )1 0 1 2 1 3 2s Tc y y= α +α η× +α +α        (22) 
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Table 5: Coding for indicator variables x1 and x2 
Contribution comparison y1 y2 
ψ 1 > ψ 2 1 0 
ψ 1 = ψ 2 0 0 
ψ 1 < ψ 2 0 1 
The best fit results using Table 4 data are shown in Table 6. For the overall regression, the 
coefficient of determination, R2, equals 0.83 with a p-value of 0.000.  The low p-value indicates 
statistical significance, and the results are unlikely to have occurred by chance, thereby supporting 
the reliability of the regression results (Montgomery et al., 2012). Accordingly, the effects of risk 
aversion and agents’ contribution in the project on s1 are significant. This provides further 
support for Propositions 1 and 2.  
 
Table 6: Regression results for Equation (22) 
 α0 α 1 α 2 α 3 
Value 0.31 -0.008 0.108 -0.103 
Monetary time incentive for team 
The corresponding results of monetary time incentive for team are outlined in Tables 7 and 8 and 
graphically shown in Figures 2 and 3. 
 
Table 7: Agents team’s average sharing ratio values selected by the risk-averse participants 
2
Tc
σ  
η× Tc 
5 6.7 8.3 10 12.5 14.3 16.7 20 25 33.3 
0.0003 0.95 0.89 0.88 0.83 0.81 0.69 0.66 0.56 0.5 0.55 
0.0011 0.75 0.72 0.63 0.65 0.63 0.49 0.49 0.39 0.33 0.35 
0.0025 0.6 0.56 0.52 0.49 0.48 0.33 0.35 0.26 0.2 0.2 
0.007 0.45 0.4 0.42 0.35 0.34 0.21 0.25 0.16 0.1 0.13 
0.01 0.4 0.3 0.35 0.25 0.28 0.18 0.2 0.1 0.05 0.05 
 
Table 8: Agents team’s average fixed fee/Tc values selected by the risk-averse participants 
2
Tc
σ  
η× Tc 
5 6.7 8.3 10 12.5 14.3 16.7 20 25 33.3 
0.0003 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.12 
0.0011 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.1 0.12 0.12 0.13 
0.0025 0.1 0.1 0.11 0.11 0.1 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 
0.007 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 
0.01 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 
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Figure 2: Agent team time incentive/disincentive sharing ratio 
 
Figure 3: Agent team fixed fee 
 
Figure 2 shows the consortium’s average share of monetary value of time underrun/overrun 
selected by the risk-averse contractors. The results show that an increase in the level of actual cost 
uncertainty leads to a decrease in the value of s selected by the contractors, reflecting the 
contractors' concerns. This supports the validity of Proposition 3a. Chang (2013) states that risk 
sharing should be based on a reasoned assessment of risk and return trade-offs. Figure 2 also 
demonstrates that an increase in the value of s follows from a decrease in the level of risk 
aversion.  This supports the validity of Proposition 3b. 
The consortium’s average fixed fee values are illustrated in Figure 3, and present an opposing 
trend to Figure 2. An increase in the fixed fee follows from an increase in the level of time 
underrun/overrun uncertainty, reflecting the contractors' concerns about uncertainty in the actual 
time of the work.  This supports the validity of Proposition 4a. Figure 3 also demonstrates that an 
increase in the value of s follows from a decrease in the level of risk aversion.  This supports the 
validity of Proposition 5b. 
Using regression equations of the form, 
( )0 1 2
kn Tc
Tc
σ = β +β η× +β  
         (23) 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
A
ge
nt
 te
am
 ti
m
e 
sh
ar
in
g 
ra
tio
Level of risk aversion ×Tc
Very low uncertainty
Low uncertainty
Usual uncertainty
High uncertainty
Very high uncertainty
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Fi
xe
d 
fe
e 
/ 
Tc
Level of risk aversion × Tc
Very high uncertainty
High uncertainty
Usual uncertainty
Low uncertianty
Very low uncertainty
Construction Economics and Building, 16(4), 35-53  
 
 
Hosseinian 48 
 
( )0 1 2
kF Tc
Tc
σ = δ + δ η× + δ  
         (24) 
where σ is actual time standard deviation, and β0, β 1, β 2, δ0, δ1 and δ2 are constant coefficients, the 
best fit regression results using Tables 7 and 8 data are shown in Tables 9 and 10, respectively 
with a p-value of 0.000.  The low p-value shows that the effects of time uncertainty and risk 
aversion on the team’s monetary value of time underrun/overrun and the team’s fixed fee are 
significant (Montgomery et al., 2012), providing further support for propositions 3 and 4.   
 
Table 9: Regression results for Equation (23) 
  Coefficient  
 β 0 β 1 β 2 
Value 0.93 -0.02 -5.2 
 
Table 10: Regression results for Equation (24) 
  Coefficient  
 δ 0 δ 1 δ 2 
Value 0.054 0.002 0.625 
Recommendations 
Based on the paper's analysis and data, it is possible to provide quantitative advice on the choice 
of ratios. In the cumulative frequency plot, Figure 4 using Figure 1 data, the level of risk aversion 
for the sample agents (contractors) is classified into three groups: low, medium and high. The 
classification is based on quartiles, giving a low risk aversion lying between 5.0/Tc and 7.5/Tc, a 
medium risk aversion between 7.5/Tc and 14.3/Tc, and a high risk aversion between 14.3/Tc and 
33.3/Tc. 
 
Figure 4:  Distribution of the level of risk aversion between sample agents 
The results that follow are relatively insensitive to the choice of boundaries between low, medium 
and high risk aversion; the boundaries can change by ±10% in the level of risk aversion without 
changing the recommendations. 
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Time incentive/disincentive sharing among two agents 
By calculating the average sharing ratios, taken from Tables 4 and 7 data, for the risk aversion 
classification, presented in Figure 4, recommended values of time incentive/disincentive sharing 
among two agents were obtained. These are summarized in Table 11 for five levels of time 
uncertainty, 'very low', 'low', 'usual', 'high' and 'very high' as defined in Table 3. 
In Table 11 the sharing ratio varies from 0.71 to 0.03. The highest sharing ratio (n = 0.71) needs 
to be used in order to work with very low uncertainty (well defined projects), where a low risk-
averse agent with a high contribution is engaged.  By contrast, the lowest sharing ratio (n = 0.03) 
needs to be offered to a high risk-averse agent with a low contribution in a very high time 
uncertainty work (poor defined projects, or projects involved new technologies). Previous 
research has omitted the effect of the agent contribution, time uncertainty and risk aversion 
simultaneously on an optimal time sharing with a team of agents. For example, Sakal (2005) and 
Love et al., (2011) suggest that any gain/pain should be spread 50:50 between the principal and 
agent in alliance projects. With a high sharing ratio, the contract corresponds to a fixed-price 
(lump sum or schedule of rates) contract and with a low sharing ratio the contract corresponds to 
a cost-reimbursement contract in practice. Accordingly, fixed-price contracts should be used in 
very low uncertain projects and cost-reimbursement contracts should be employed in very high 
uncertain projects. This is consistent with Eisenhardt’s (1989) study who believes that for work 
where the outcome has a low level of uncertainty, the outcome-based contract is more attractive, 
compared to work with a high level of uncertainty, where a behaviour-based contract is 
considered more attractive. 
 
Table 11:  Recommended values of agent time incentive/disincentive sharing ratio in a team of 
two agents 
Uncertainty 
level 
Contribution 
comparison 
Risk aversion level 
Low Medium High 
Very low Lower 0.20 0.22 0.16 
Same 0.45 0.41 0.29 
Higher 0.71 0.60 0.42 
Low Lower 0.16 0.17 0.11 
Same 0.36 0.31 0.20 
Higher 0.57 0.45 0.30 
Usual Lower 0.13 0.13 0.07 
Same 0.29 0.24 0.14 
Higher 0.44 0.35 0.20 
High Lower 0.09 0.09 0.05 
Same 0.21 0.17 0.09 
Higher 0.32 0.25 0.13 
Very high Lower 0.07 0.07 0.03 
Same 0.16 0.14 0.06 
Higher 0.25 0.20 0.09 
In a situation where there is no information about the agent’s level of risk aversion and only 
general information about the level of contribution and time uncertainty exists, practitioners will 
find Table 12 useful for determining a suitable value for the sharing ratio.  This table summarizes 
the average sharing ratio for each level of time uncertainty and the agent contribution presented in 
Table 11. 
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Table 12:  Recommended values of agent time incentive/disincentive sharing ratio in a team of 
two agents for different levels of time uncertainty and agent contribution. 
Uncertainty 
level 
Contribution 
comparison 
Lower Same Higher 
Very low 0.19 0.38 0.57 
Low 0.15 0.29 0.44 
Usual 0.11 0.21 0.31 
High 0.08 0.16 0.24 
Very high 0.06 0.12 0.18 
Example usage 
An example is presented to demonstrate how a time sharing formula can be established in any 
given situation. Consider a project with two agents, namely Agent A and Agent B, where the 
agent's fee is defined as in Equation (1). Assume, for a given project, that the utility assessments 
reveal that Agent A and Agent B are both risk-averse with, respectively, 8.33/Tc and 20/Tc levels 
of risk aversion. By using data presented in Figure 4 and Table 11, recommended values of the 
time sharing ratio, si, for the given agents can be obtained. These are summarized in Table 13 for 
three levels of time uncertainty, 'low', 'usual' and 'high', as defined in Table 3. 
 
Table 13:  Values of time incentive/disincentive sharing ratio for the given example agents  
Case Uncertainty 
level 
Contribution Sharing ratio Team 
sharing 
ratio 
Agent A Agent B Agent A Agent B 
1 Low Low High 0.17 0.30 0.47 
2 Same Same 0.31 0.20 0.51 
3 High Low 0.45 0.11 0.56 
4 Usual Low High 0.13 0.20 0.33 
5 Same Same 0.24 0.14 0.38 
6 High Low 0.35 0.07 0.42 
7 High Low High 0.09 0.13 0.22 
8 Same Same 0.17 0.09 0.26 
9 High Low 0.25 0.05 0.30 
A similar approach can be adopted for other agents and other project situations by using the data 
in Figure 4 and Table 11. 
Conclusion 
This paper derived the optimal form of a time incentive/disincentive-based compensation in 
contracts with a team of agents through extending principal-agent theory. The paper 
demonstrated that the proportion of monetary value of time incentive/disincentive among agents 
with the same risk-attitude should be higher for agents with a higher contribution to the project. 
The paper also demonstrated that the proportion of monetary value of time 
incentive/disincentive sharing among agents with the same level of contribution should be lower 
for agents with higher levels of risk aversion. In addition, the paper showed that the proportion of 
monetary value of time incentive/disincentive to a team of agents should reduce and the fixed 
component of the team fee should increase when the agents within the team become more risk-
averse or the level of the time uncertainty increases. The shape of the time incentive contract 
derived here is optimal under defined assumptions such as linear payments, agents risk aversion 
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and principal risk neutrality. The  empirical results obtained provide highly persuasive evidence 
and support for the paper's theoretical development.  
This paper gives an original solution to the optimal time incentive/disincentive problem with a 
team of agents, contributing to current practices in contracts management. Typically, construction 
literature are survey-based with little intention to test hypotheses derived from theories. This 
research applies the principal-agent theory to the analysis of optimal incentive/disincentive 
contracts in construction to address the theoretical void. Principals and agents might have a 
general idea about risk sharing and agent motivation; however their decisions on contract form, at 
present, are not based on any rigorous model or theory. Setting risk transfer at the right level can 
potentially result in cost savings and ignoring an optimal risk sharing may lead the principal to 
misuse incentives. The principal may lose more than the agents in the event of project disruption, 
as it is vulnerable to holdup demands in renegotiations and the principal may incur more 
transaction costs in resolving disputes. The paper’s outcome provides guidance to those involved 
in designing contracts for choosing the best way to reward/penalize multiple agents, forming a 
team, through the terms of a contract for any time underrun/overrun. Where the time incentive 
contract is the subject of negotiation, the insight from this paper should assist the contracting 
parties in that negotiation. Although the primary reference is to construction projects, the 
solutions presented here apply equally well to related project types. The theoretical results were 
supported through conducting an empirical study based on interviewing a sample of medium-
sized contractors in the commercial and building fields, and hence the support for the theoretical 
results is limited to similar situations, until further data has been assembled.  
A number of extensions to the present paper are possible; for example, multi-period contracts.  
These contracts move beyond the static model discussed here towards dynamic models that are 
enforced by the parties’ concerns for their reputations. Another extension is to consider the effect 
of the repeated relationship and career concerns on the time incentive arrangements. This paper 
presents the optimal sharing arrangement for the one-principal case. Further extension could be 
made to develop a contract with multiple principals. Another possible extension would be to 
consider a survey or questionnaire to capture industry professionals' concerns about the outcomes 
of this research. It is acknowledged that there may exist parameters affecting the selection of the 
optimal time incentive contract other than those considered in this paper, and this creates the 
potential for future research.  
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